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MINING MEGALITHS IN THE ARGENTINE ANDES:
WHERE WILL VICTIMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION FIND JUSTICE?
CATHERINE M. WILMARTH*
The debate over mining in Argentina has become more pressing
in the past decade as increasingly larger mining projects develop and
pose a threat to the environment. With the progress of information
technology, more voices are using the Internet to bring awareness to the
negative effects that mining sites have on local communities.1 The recent
2010 Copiapó mining accident in Chile, during which thirty-three miners
were trapped underground for sixty-nine days after a mine collapsed,2
brought awareness to the issues of safety and regulation of mining in the
Andes Mountains.3 The San José Mine involved in the incident had been
closed in 2007 in relation to the death of a worker, but reopened in 2008
despite not having complied with all the regulations imposed on it to
begin operating again.4
Even before this incident, however, a debate had already been
developing in Latin America, among the international community, and
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, B.A., 2009, Major in International Relations and Minor in
Hispanic Studies, The College of William & Mary. The author would like to thank her
family—especially Dad, Mom, Ted, Tom, and Ron—and her friends for supporting her
throughout law school. She’d also like to thank Daniel Taillant and the Centro de
Derechos Humanos y Ambiente for all they taught and showed her on this subject.
Lastly, she’d like to thank the Board and all those who made Volume 36 happen.
1 See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
2 See Times Topics: Chile Mining Accident (2010), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com
/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/chile_mining_accident_2010/index.html (last updated
Oct. 12, 2011).
3 See Pascale Bonnefoy, Poor Safety Standards Led to Chilean Mine Disaster,
GLOBALPOST (Aug. 29, 2010, 2:19 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/chile/100828
/mine-safety; Eric Marx, Chile’s Mines: Rescue that Should Never Have Been Needed,
ETHICAL CORP. (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.ethicalcorp.com/communications-reporting
/chile%E2%80%99s-mines-rescue-should-never-have-been-needed (describing interna-
tional ratification of an International Labour Organisation convention on health and
safety in mines).
4 See Gideon Long, How Safe Are Chile’s Copper Mines?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010,
5:39 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11467279; see also Bonnefoy,
supra note 3.
959
960 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:959
most visibly, online, concerning mining projects in South America.5 Two
large projects in particular in Latin America—Pascua-Lama and
Veladero, which are only ten kilometers apart6—have faced the brunt of
public condemnation7 and will be the examples of the crises upon which
this Note will focus. With respect to these two sites, discussion focuses
on a number of issues: the company’s economic impact assessment that
originally proposed to “relocate” glaciers,8 claims in court over ownership
of the land,9 an agreement developed by Chile and Argentina to allow a
mining site that sat both on Argentine and Chilean territory,10 and the
lobbying power of Barrick Gold Corporation (“Barrick”), the owner of
Pascua-Lama and Veladero, in Argentina to shoot down the previous Ley
de Glaciares (“Glacier Law”) in 2008 and to fight the current 2010 ver-
sion.11 Pascua-Lama, Veladero, and the nearby communities affected by
the mining activity at these two sites are landmark examples that
epitomize the character and attitudes of powerful foreign extraction
firms, the environmental damage of mining, and the polarizing nature
of economic development in the Andes Mountains.
5 See infra note 13 and accompanying text (giving examples of watchdog web sites that
track mining projects and their consequences).
6 Pascua-Lama, BARRICK GOLD CORP., http://barrick.com/GlobalOperations/SouthAmerica
/PascuaLamaProject/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2012)
7 See Barrick Gold Faces Determined Opposition at Pascua Lama and Veladero,
MININGWATCH CANADA (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.miningwatch.ca/barrick-gold-faces
-determined-opposition-pascua-lama-and-veladero.
8 See infra notes 78–84 and accompanying text; see also BARRICK GOLD CORP., INFORM-
ATIVO PROYECTO PASCUA-LAMA [PASCUA-LAMA PROJECT BULLETIN] (June 2005) (on file
with author).
9 14 Juzgado Civil de Santiago [14 J.Civ. Santiago] [ 14th Civil Court of Santiago], 19
junio 2006, “Villar, Rodolfo c. Compañía Minera Nevada,” Rol de la causa: C-1912-2001
[hereinafter Villar, Rodolfo c. Compañía Minera Nevada] (on file with author).
10 Mining Integration and Complementation Treaty Between Chile and Argentina, Chile-
Arg., Dec. 29, 1997, available at http://www.cochilco.cl/english/normativa/descarga
/tratado-chile-argentina.pdf; see BARRICK GOLD CORP., BEYOND BORDERS: A SPECIAL
REPORT ON PASCUA-LAMA 10 (2009), available at http://www.barrick.com/Theme/Barrick
/files/docs_csr/BeyondBorders-BarrickGold-ResponsibleMining-PascuaLama-Sept09
-v2.pdf (indicating that this treaty made the Pascua-Lama site possible).
11 See Kyle Younker, Ley de Glaciares: Caught in the Balance, THE ARGENTINA
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/socialissues
/environment/ley-de -glaciares-caught-in-the-balance-/; see also Gov’t, San Juan Province
Governor Accused of ‘Economic Ties’ with Mining Company, BUENOS AIRES HERALD (July 7,
2010), available at http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/38619/govt-san-juan-province
-governor-accused-of-economic-ties-with-mining-company (discussing the “traffic of in-
fluence” and suspicious ties between politicians and mining companies).
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The mining companies’ propensity to damage the environment and
societies has drawn increasing attention from multiple communities and
organizations.12 Currently a number of watchdog web sites maintained
both by Latin Americans and by North Americans track every move of
the mining giants.13 Many of these large American, Canadian, and Austra-
lian companies have operations not only in Latin America, but also in
North America and around the world as well, which make the environ-
mental sustainability of mining a global issue.14 This newfound aware-
ness brought about by the public’s increased access to information and
to publicizing resources has caused governments to take a closer look at
the statutes and regulations currently in place, and to respond by propos-
ing a number of new pieces of legislation that make mining companies
more accountable.15 Bills limit the allowable methods of mining and
increase accessibility to court systems for victims of environmental degra-
dation.16 This new surge of legislation has arisen both in Argentina and
also in Canada, home to a number of international mining companies.17
Advancements of this kind in environmental protection are not
fully embraced by all parts of national government. In Argentina, current
president Cristina Kirchner and several representatives from prominent
mining provinces staunchly support the gross incentivization of extrac-
tion development.18 They defend the interests of companies like Barrick,
12 With regard to Barrick, see generally CORPWATCH, BARRICK’S DIRTY SECRETS:
COMMUNITIES RESPOND TO GOLD MINING’S IMPACTS WORLDWIDE (May 2007), available
at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14466.
13 See, e.g., PROTEST BARRICK, http://protestbarrick.net/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2012);
MININGWATCH, http://www.miningwatch.ca/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2012); MINES AND
COMMUNITIES, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
14 Large companies with a presence in Latin America include Barrick Gold Corporation,
Rio Tinto, and Xstrata, among many others. E.g., History, BARRICK GOLD CORP.,
http://www.barrick.com/Company/History/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2012); At a
Glance, RIO TINTO, http://www.riotinto.com /aboutus/19602_overivew.asp (last visited
Apr. 6, 2012); At a Glance, XSTRATA, http://www.xstrata.com/about/at-a-glance/ (last
visited Apr. 6, 2012).
15 See infra Parts II–III.
16 See infra Parts II–III.
17 See Factbox: Argentine Legislation that Targets Mining, REUTERS (Aug. 17,
2010, 1:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/17/us-argentina-glaciers-factbox
-idUKTRE67G46320100817 (discussing the national Glacier Law and provincial mining
laws); Matthew Hill, Son of Dead Antimining Activist in Canada Lobbying for Tougher
Laws, MINING WEEKLY, Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/son-of
-murdered-anti-mining-activist-in-canada-lobbying-for-tougher-laws-2010-10-01
(discussing Bills C-300 and C-354 in Canada).
18 See Gov’t, San Juan Province Governor Accused of ‘Economic Ties’ with Mining
Company, supra note 11. See generally UNDERSECRETARIAT OF MINING, 10 REASONS TO
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a Canadian firm that is the global leader in gold production,19 and fight
tooth and nail against any environmental regulation that will constrict
the freedom of those companies.20 Other national actors, whose constitu-
encies depend less on mining investment and activity, are more willing
to defend environmental interests and support bills that propound limita-
tions for mining companies.21 This political divide makes for a lot of
heated debate: in 2008 the Argentine National Congress passed a bill
protecting glaciers, the original Glacier Law,22 but President Cristina
Kirchner vetoed it under pressure from mining interests.23 This turn of
presidential support contributed to a rift between President Cristina
Kirchner and Romina Picolotti, the former Secretary of Environment and
Sustainable Development, who later resigned.24 The 2010 version passed
in October by the National Congress has already been declared in part
unconstitutional and suspended in the province of San Juan,25 which is
the leading pro-mining region.26 The sharp divisions that these regula-
tions cause may make enforcement in Argentina difficult to bring about.
INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING 8–13, available at http://www.argentina.org.au/10
%20reasons%20to%20invest%20in%20Argentine%20Mining.pdf (listing government
regulatory and fiscal incentives to invest in mining operations).
19 Company: Profile, BARRICK GOLD CORP., http://www.barrick.com/Company/Profile
/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
20 See Gov’t, San Juan Province Governor Accused of ‘Economic Ties’ with Mining
Company, supra note 11 (discussing politicians’ ties with mining companies and the veto
of the Glacier Law).
21 Miguel Bonasso, a national deputy from the coastal capital of Buenos Aires, has been
the main supporter of the new Glacier Law. El Proyecto de Ley de Glaciares Sólo Se
Aprobó en General [The Glacier Law Project Was Only Approved in General],
PARLAMENTARIO.COM (July 15, 2010), http://parlamentario.com/noticia-30332.html. The
opposition tends to come from national leaders and provincial leaders of mining regions,
such as the Governor of San Juan, José Luís Gioja. See Gov’t, San Juan Province
Governor Accused of ‘Economic Ties’ with Mining Company, supra note 11 (discussing
Gioja’s and the President’s resistance to impediments to mining).
22 Gustavo Ybarra, La Ley de los Glaciares Influyó en la Destitución de Picolotti [The
Glacier Law Influenced the Dismissal of Picolotti], LA NACIÓN (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www
.lanacion.com.ar/1077233-la-ley-de-los-glaciares-influyo-en-la-destitucion-de-picolotti.
23 Younker, supra note 11.
24 Ybarra, supra note 22.
25 See Suspenden la Aplicación de la Ley de Glaciares en San Juan [Court Suspends the
Application of the Glacier Law in San Juan], DIARIO DE CUYO (Nov. 2, 2010, 11:50 AM),
http://www.diariodecuyo.com.ar/home/new_noticia.php?noticia_id=430671.
26 See Younker, supra note 11.
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In Canada, the Parliament has already defeated one of two bills
proposed to make Canadian mining companies responsible for their
actions in developing countries.27 Despite widespread support from
academics, watchdog organizations, and international non-governmental
organizations,28 mining and extractive interests have put up a fight
against Canadian legislation that would make them more vulnerable to
examination and lawsuits.29 Though regulating and filing suit against
corporations through the nation in which they are incorporated may
make decisions easier to enforce,30 many of the citizens of these first-
world countries are less aware and feel less connected to the environmen-
tal and societal effects that mining has in less developed countries.31 For
this reason they are less inclined to impose restrictions based upon
violations they have not witnessed. But supporters of this type of legisla-
tion argue that enforcing sanctions against violations, and improve-
ments in the ethos of corporate social responsibility, will give Canadian
companies a more professional business edge on the global scene.32
By supporting, passing, and beginning to enforce these laws,
especially in Argentina, the international community has finally recog-
nized the destructivity of mining and arranged a number of easily acces-
sible mechanisms to keep the activities of corporations in check. Previous
applicable law, the Argentine Mining Code,33 does not take a hard
enough stance on the matter of enforcement and aims mainly to facilitate
investment into the country by attracting foreign corporations. By creat-
ing opportunities for justice in a number of different fora, private per-
sons, communities, non-governmental organizations, and provincial and
27 See Liezel Hill, Canadian Lawmakers Vote Down Controversial Bill C-300, MINING
WEEKLY, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/canadian-mps-vote-against
-bill-c-300-2010-10-28; see also An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the
Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries, R.S.C. 2009, c. C-300 (Can.)
(proposed legislation), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication
.aspx?Docid=3658424&file=4 [hereinafter Bill C-300].
28 Supporters of C-300, HONOURABLE JOHN MCKAY PC, MP SCARBOROUGH (Oct. 26,
2009), http://www.johnmckaymp.on.ca/newsshow.asp?int_id=80590.
29 See Hill, supra note 27.
30 Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic
Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 402–03 (2001).
31 See Jim Lobe, Gold Jewelry—World’s Dirtiest Valentine’s Gift?, INTER PRESS SERV.
(Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.ipsnews.net/new_nota.asp?idnews=27432.
32 RICHARD JANDA, BILL C-300: SOUND AND MEASURED REINFORCEMENT FOR CSR 2 (2009),
available at http://www.johnmckaymp.on.ca/images/newsmanager/newsfiles/bill%20c-300
%20report%20-%20final.pdf.
33 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 18.
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national governments may use the new laws to finally place a check on
the previously minimally regulated mining company activity. With the
choice between trying these cases in Argentine courts because they
represent the state in which the projects are located and trying these
issues in foreign court systems such as that of Canada because they have
jurisdiction over the companies that manage the projects, one must
wonder: which course of jurisdiction, statute, and enforcement shows
better promise in truly putting an end to environmental abuses by
mining companies?
The Argentine government heavily encourages mining projects
operated by Canadian and American companies in the Argentine Andes
Mountains because it believes these operations will bring investment and
jobs into the country.34 The reality of the situation is that the promised
benefits are not fully realized,35 and that the Argentine government
minimally regulates the activities of these companies36 as they damage
the environment and harm nearby communities.37 Argentine and Cana-
dian legislatures are currently debating a number of different pieces of
legislation that would help to remedy this situation.38 In Argentina, the
Glacier Law, which was once previously passed but vetoed by President
Cristina Kirchner, has now been passed by the legislature39 in a new and
more extensive form.40 There are also a number of other national and
provincial bills to outlaw open-pit mining,41 a highly destructive and
dangerous technique most frequently used in Argentina to mine various
34 See Minería—Objetivos [Mining—Objectives], SECRETARÍA DE MINERÍA DE LA NACIÓN
[SECRETARIAT OF MINING OF THE ARGENTINE NATION], http://www.mineria.gov.ar/objetivos
.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
35 See generally Issue Areas, PROTEST BARRICK, http://protestbarrick.net/section.php?id=4
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
36 See Cole Robertson, In the Shadow of a Mine: Pollution, Corruption and Crime,
ARGENTINA INDEPENDENT (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/feature
/in-the-shadow-of-a-mine-pollution-corruption-and-crime-/.
37 See generally Issues Areas, supra note 35, at subsecs. “Indigenous/Community Rights,”
“Environment.”
38 See infra Parts II–III.
39 See Diputados Aprobó el Proyecto de Protección de Glaciares Que Había Vetado
Cristina [Deputies Approved the Glacier Protection Project That Cristina Had Vetoed],
CLARÍN (July 15, 2010, 8:11 AM), http://beta.clarin.com/politica/congreso/Diputados
-proyecto-proteccion-glaciares-Cristina_0_298770304.html.
40 See El Proyecto de Ley de Glaciares Sólo Se Aprobó en General, supra note 21; see also
Diputados Aprobó el Proyecto de Protección de Glaciares que Había Vetado Cristina,
supra note 39.
41 Younker, supra note 11.
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minerals, including silver and gold.42 In Canada there are two bills,
C-300 and C-354,43 which would allow foreign parties to sue Canadian
corporations in Canadian courts for environmental and human rights
violations and other torts they commit in developing countries.44 All of
these pieces of legislation have created and may help create a number of
new frameworks under which the victims of environmental degradation
can seek justice for the abuses of mining companies.
This Note argues that the Argentine framework for bringing
mining companies to justice is the mechanism with the most promise for
success and enforcement. Part I of this Note will examine the current
state of mining projects and the environment in Argentina, including two
of the most controversial projects: the Pascua-Lama and Veladero sites,
owned by the Canadian corporation Barrick. It will detail Barrick’s
previous social and environmental atrocities, including the corporation’s
proposal to “move glaciers.” Part II will examine the Argentine Mining
Code, the Glacier Law, and new provincial bills proposing to ban open-pit
mining and the use of toxic substances, and will look at the text of the
bills and their reception in Argentina to assess whether they provide a
viable outlet for justice. Part III will examine the current Canadian
42 See Robertson, supra note 36; see also Latin America Gold Rush Comes with Concerns,
MSNBC (April 15, 2005, 8:25 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7404461/ns/us_news
-environment.
43 An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in
Developing Countries, R.S.C. 2009, c. C-300 (Can.) (proposed legislation); An Act to
Amend the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights), R.S.C. 2009, c. C-354 (Can.) (proposed legislation), available at http://www.parl
.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=3796994 (last
visited Apr. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Bill C-354]. While C-300 was defeated in the Fortieth
Parliament, see Hill, supra note 27, C-354 was reintroduced as C-323 in the Forty-first
Parliament in October, 2011. Bill C-354 (Historical), OPENPARLIAMENT.CA, http://
openparliament.ca/bills/40-3/C-354/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2012). The bill as reintroduced
is substantially the same, adding only the phrase “that are” to subpart 1. An Act to
Amend the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights), R.S.C. 2011, c. C-323 (Can.) (proposed legislation), available at http://www.parl
.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5160018&file=4 (last visited Apr. 6,
2012) [hereinafter Bill C-323]. Because much of the discussion of this bill with respect to
mining references the bill by its Fortieth Parliament session number, this Note shall do
the same.
44 An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in
Developing Countries, R.S.C. 2009, c. C-300 (Can.) (proposed legislation); An Act to
Amend the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights), R.S.C. 2009, c. C-354 (Can.) (proposed legislation).
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Environmental Protection Act,45 the proposed bills C-300 and C-354, and
the text of these bills and their reception in Canada, to analyze whether
they will be useful for victims of environmental degradation. Finally, this
Note will conclude that the Argentine system is the better forum for suits
against mining companies due to its laws with more specific content,
preferable enforcement mechanisms, interested public, and proximity to
the victims of mining’s destructive activity.
I. MINING IN THE ANDES MOUNTAINS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES
Mining in the Andes Mountains has been an important part of the
Argentine economy for decades, and particularly in recent years due to
increased government focus on the industry.46 The Argentine govern-
ment created a “first generation” of mining projects by opening up these
mineral-rich regions to large numbers of private investors in the early
1990s.47 With this first round of investment came large growth in the
field, and the Argentine government continues to pursue this growth in
its promotion of a “second generation” of projects.48 However, as the indus-
try has grown over the past two decades, the problematic side effects of
mining have shown themselves. These include negative impacts on small
communities proximate to mining operations,49 the environmental dangers
of the mining process,50 the failure of the Argentine government in regulat-
ing these private investors,51 and the contribution of mining to the retreat
of glaciers located in South America’s Andes Mountains.52
A. The Case of Pascua-Lama and Veladero
Pascua-Lama is a major gold mining site owned by Barrick, which
is the world’s largest mining company and is based out of Canada.53
45 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33 (Can.).
46 See 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 6, 8.
47 Id. at 6.
48 Id.
49 See generally Press Release, Ctr. for Human Rights and Env’t, Community Affected by
Barrick Gold Marches Against Veladero and Pascua Lama Mines (Mar. 4, 2010),
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20101202195826/http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/more
_information/comunity-barrick.php (describing the effects of Veladero and Pascua-Lama
on the nearby community of Tudcum).
50 See infra Part I.B.
51 See infra Part I.B.
52 See infra Part I.C.
53 Company: Profile, supra note 19.
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The site sits in the Andes Mountains on the border between Chile and
Argentina.54 It has become infamous for a number of reasons: there is a
controversial multinational treaty called the Mining Integration and
Complementation Treaty to enable the site,55 there has been litigation
in courts over whether Barrick has proper title to the land,56 and the site
is located on top of or nearby a number of ice formations, which some
consider glaciers while others consider them “glaciarettes,” an entity
possibly not protected by law.57
Barrick has been studying and preparing the site for nearly two
decades.58 It has almost US $3,000,000,000 as a pre-production capital
estimate, expects a twenty-five-plus-year life for the site, hopes to create
about 5500 jobs, and has “17.8 million ounces of proven and probable
gold reserves; 718 million ounces of silver contained within gold reserves;
[and] 4.7 million ounces of measured and indicated gold resources.”59
Barrick expects to end its preparatory phase and begin its actual opera-
tional mining phase in 2013.60 Barrick is the world’s leading mining
company in gold extraction and is based out of Toronto, Canada.61 It has
twenty-six currently operating mines and a number of projects in devel-
opment across five continents, with “140 million ounces of proven and
probable gold reserves. In addition [the company has] 12.7 billion pounds
of copper reserves and 1.07 billion ounces of silver contained within gold
reserves as of December 31, 2011.”62 Barrick has been expanding as a
power in mining in recent years, subsuming many smaller mining firms
that owned operations in Latin America.63
54 BARRICK GOLD CORP., BUILDING PASCUA-LAMA FACTSHEET (2009), available at http://
www.barrick.com/Theme/Barrick/files/docs_project/PascuaLamaFactsheet-May2009.pdf.
55 Gustavo González, Pascua Lama Gold Mine, A Threat to Sustainability, INTER PRESS
SERV. (June 5, 2006), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33501.
56 9/12 Suprema Falla en Juicio Que Complica a Pascua Lama [9/12 The Supreme Court
Decides in Case that is Complicating Pascua Lama], CAPITAL (Dec. 9, 2008), http://
www.capital.cl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3090&Itemid=56.
57 See BUILDING PASCUA-LAMA FACTSHEET, supra note 54; BARRICK GOLD CORP., PASCUA-
LAMA 2010 RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 1 (2010), available at http://www.barrick.com/Theme
/Barrick/files/responsibility-reports/2010/pascua-lama.pdf.
58 See BUILDING PASCUA-LAMA FACTSHEET, supra note 54.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Company: Profile, supra note 19.
62 Id.
63 See History, BARRICK GOLD CORP., http://www.barrick.com/Company/History/default
.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (detailing Barrick’s mergers and mine acquisitions over
the years).
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The tract of land on which Pascua-Lama is located originally was
closed to mining under Chilean and Argentine law because it was within
border zones between the two countries.64 The matter of the boundary
between Chile and Argentina has created tension between the two
nations and disputes over various parts of the Southern Patagonian Ice
Fields continue to this day and has led to various agreements.65 The
presidents of Chile and Argentina signed the Mining Integration and
Complementation Treaty66 in 1997, which their legislatures approved in
2000, that allowed Barrick to advance with its prospecting.67 The Treaty
has faced criticism from non-governmental organizations in Latin Amer-
ica and has survived challenges to its constitutionality.68 The Regional
Environment Commission (“COREMA”) resolved the issue for Chile when
it decided to allow the project but forbid Barrick from “relocating” three
glaciers that are a part of the site.69
Disputes over ownership of the land for Pascua-Lama have
dragged on in court for years. A man named Rodolfo Villar acquired a
3100-hectare parcel of land in Chile in 1996 that was proximate to
Barrick’s Pascua-Lama site.70 Villar thought that he could get a sizeable
sum for the land when Barrick came looking to purchase it in 1997 since
the only road to the mine ran through it.71 On the same day Barrick
approached Villar, it purchased a much smaller plot for $650,000; however,
Villar received only $20 for his parcel, in part because of an untrustworthy
lawyer.72 Villar sued Barrick in 2001, and in 2006 the 14th Civil Court of
Santiago nullified the contract of sale and ordered the land returned to
Villar.73 Barrick appealed this decision arguing that the deciding judge was
not qualified to decide, but the Supreme Court upheld her competency.74
64 The Real Blunder of Pascua Lama, MININGWATCH (July 6, 2006), http://www
.miningwatch.ca/real-blunder-pascua-lama.
65 See, e.g., Mining Integration and Complementation Treaty Between Chile and
Argentina, supra note 10 (providing an example of an agreement formed around the
boundary controversy).
66 Id.
67 González, Pascua Lama Gold Mine, supra note 55.
68 See Daniela Estrada, ‘Yes’ to Gold Mine, But Don’t Touch the Glaciers, INTER PRESS
SERV. (Feb, 15, 2006), http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32174.
69 Id.
70 Rick Westhead, Fighting a Gold Goliath, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 10, 2007, http://www
.thestar.com/article/190390.
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 Villar, Rodolfo c. Compañía Minera Nevada, supra note 9.
74 9/12 Suprema Falla en Juicio que Complica a Pascua Lama [9/12 The Supreme Court
Decides in Case that Is Complicating Pascua Lama], supra note 56.
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The website of the Chilean judiciary shows activity in the case as recent
as July 6, 2011.75
The three glaciers mentioned in COREMA’s decision have caused
a large amount of trouble for Barrick. They are named Toro 1, Toro 2,
and Esperanza, and the total amount of ice that Pascua-Lama endangers
is approximately twenty hectares, or 300,000 to 800,000 cubic meters.76
These glaciers compose one of the main environmental conflicts facing
Barrick in moving forward with mining at Pascua-Lama. Most authori-
ties have allowed Pascua-Lama to proceed with the stipulation that
Barrick tread lightly with respect to the glaciers.77 The company’s initial
Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (“EIA,” Environmental Impact Evalua-
tion) prepared for Chile neglected to mention the glaciers,78 and later
versions proposed to “relocate” the three glaciers that were situated within
the site.79 They even went so far as to hand out Spanish language pam-
phlets to the local community, explaining in a series of cartoons how they
were going to do so: they would use hydraulic excavators to break up the
glaciers and load the ice blocks into trucks, which they would then
transport to a deposit site at a nearby glacier outside of Pascua-Lama,
where they would pile the ice and then fence it in to help the ice blocks
re-form with the large mass of the original glacier.80 The scientific com-
munity rejects this technique of “relocating” glaciers, as it removes an
essential part of ecosystems,81 and the Chilean government eventually
denied this part of their proposal.82
75 Consulto Causas: C-1912-2001 [Case Inquiry: C-1912-2001], PODER JUDICIAL [THE
JUDICIARY], http://civil.poderjudicial.cl/CIVILPORWEB/?opc_menu=7 (search by Rol and
enter a Rol Interno of “C-1912-2001" and select from the drop-down menu a Tribunal de
Origen of “14 Juzgado Civil de Santiago,” then hit “Consulta”—the one result is the case)
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
76 Gustavo González, Gold Mining Project Threatens Andean Glaciers, INTER PRESS SERV.
(June 25, 2005), http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=29223.
77 See Estrada, ‘Yes’ to Gold Mine, supra note 68.
78 See González, Pascua Lama Gold Mine, supra note 55; Ricardo Acuña, Barrick’s Gold:
Canadian Mine Threatens a Chileean Watershed, CANADIAN DIMENSION, Oct. 29, 2006,
http://canadiandimension.com/articles/1816.
79 Daniela Estrada, Conflict Over Andean Glaciers Heats Up, INTER PRESS SERV. (Nov. 11,
2005), http:www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=30994; see Glenn Walker, Barrick
Gold Strikes Opposition in South America, CORPWATCH (June 20, 2005), http://www
.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12447.
80 See INFORMATIVO PROYECTO PASCUA-LAMA, supra note 8.
81 See Walker, supra note 79 (noting “[a] glacier isn’t just a chunk of ice you can pick up
and move”).
82 Estrada, ‘Yes’ to Gold Mine, supra note 68.
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Once Argentina and Chile imposed more conditions on Barrick
that disallowed them from relocating the glaciers, Barrick changed their
platform: reclassifying the glaciers as “glaciarettes” or “ice reservoirs”
and making it easier for them to sidestep regulations on glaciers.83 The
term “glaciarette” seems to refer to smaller ice bodies that are less active.84
In addition, the use of this term literally belittles the importance of the
three ice bodies. It also provokes a number of questions concerning why
these glaciers are so small and what is being done to protect them and
support their maintenance and growth.
Barrick now promises not to disturb the glaciers intentionally,
but there is evidence suggesting that there has already been a fifty-six to
seventy percent depletion of the three “glaciarettes” so far during the
production stage.85 This may result from the unsettling of dust and rock
at the site, which can land on top of the glaciers and darken them, speed-
ing up the melting process.86 In addition, there continue to be concerns
about the chemicals used in the gold leaching process and possible
contamination of the nearby environment.87 The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) has also expressed
83 Compare INFORMATIVO PROYECTO PASCUA-LAMA, supra note 8 (using the term
“glaciares [glaciers]”), with BEYOND BORDERS: A SPECIAL REPORT ON PASCUA LAMA, supra
note 10, at 20 (using the terms “glaciarettes [glaciaretes]” or “ice fields/reservoirs
[masas/reservorios de hielo]”).
84 See BEYOND BORDERS: A SPECIAL REPORT ON PASCUA LAMA, supra note 10, at 20
(explaining that “[g]laciologists classify smaller bodies of ice as ‘glaciarettes’ or ice
reservoirs rather than traditional glaciers, which are much larger and demonstrate
movement. These smaller ice bodies are formed as the result of wind-blown snow
accumulated behind shallow hills”). It is worth noting that as of March 19, 2012, there
are two displayed hits for the search term “glaciarette” on the search engine Google. The
term “glacierette” garners more hits (although many not on point), but “glacierette” and
“Barrick” together yield only one result. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ (search the
terms “glaciarette,” then “glacierette,” and finally, “glacierette and Barrick,” and compare
the displayed results) (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
85 DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE AGUAS DEL MINISTERIO DE OBRAS PÚBLICAS [GENERAL WATER
DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS], INFORME DE COMISIÓN DE SERVICIO
A LA III REGIÓN: VISITA A PASCUA LAMA 12 DE ENERO DE 2005 [REPORT OF THE SERVICE
COMMISSION OF THE THIRD REGION: VISIT TO PASCUA LAMA JANUARY 12, 2005] (Chile) (on
file with author).
86 See BARRICK GOLD CORP., BARRICK PASCUA-LAMA SHAREHOLDER REPORT, 21 (2006),
available at http://www.barrick.com/Theme/Barrick/files/docs_ehss/ERM%20Report%20
on%20Barrick%20Pascua-Lama.pdf (noting that mining indirectly impacts ice features
because the dust unsettled by mining activities increases melting rates).
87 See Issue Areas, supra note 35, at subsec. “Environment.”
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concern with the minimal ability of Chile to set economic and environ-
mental standards.88
Tudcum is a village in San Juan, Argentina, proximate to the
Pascua-Lama and Veladero mining sites.89 The community members are
seeing a number of negative effects from the preparatory stages now
taking place.90 The decrease in water supply is what they find most
damaging, and they are also finding sludge on the riverbanks, a sign of
contamination.91 They have less water both for home consumption and
for use in agriculture.92 The community residents have seen falling crop
yields, as much as an eighty-five percent decrease, in produce including
apples, peaches, apricots, and plums.93 Deaths caused by leukemia are
beginning to appear in Tudcum, the first occurring two years after
Barrick began operating at its Veladero site.94 The community is also
seeing its first struggles with prostitution and drugs, markets newly
created in Tudcum by the arrival of workers brought into employ at the
Barrick sites.95
B. The Operation of Mining Projects Generally
The open-pit technique is utilized in South America as it allows
for reaching the deposits of gold, copper, and other minerals96 generally
found closer to the surface or in lower concentrations.97 In this technique,
miners blast terraces deeper and deeper into the ground until they hit
the largest tracts of the deposits.98 A number of toxic chemicals are then
used to separate the ores from dirt and waste material,99 most notably
88 Cecilia Vargas, Chile: El Gobierno Se Asoma al club de los Ricos [Chile: The
Government Joins the Club of the Rich], Inter Press Serv., http://ipsnoticias.net/nota
.asp?idnews=87407 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
89 Press Release, Community Affected by Barrick Gold, supra note 49.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Press Release, Community Affected by Barrick Gold, supra note 49.
96 See Robertson, supra note 36; EARTHWORKS & OXFAM AM., DIRTY METALS: MINING,
COMMUNITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (2004), available at http://www.nodirtygold.org
/pubs/DirtyMetals.pdf.
97 See 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 169 (1999); EARTHWORKS & OXFAM AM., supra note 96.
98 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 169.
99 See id.
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cyanide as an agent to extract gold.100 The waste byproducts of the separa-
tion process then compose tailings or slurry,101 which contain the excess
chemicals along with dirt and rock.102 This slurry is most often left to sit
in the mine or in a tailings dam, where these toxic substances then seep
into the ground and poison the terrain and water in the ecosystem.103
Mining projects operate in a number of stages,104 all of which are
damaging to the environment.105 In the development stages, mining
companies scout out the area to figure out where the deposits are, break-
ing deeper and deeper into the earth to find the richest veins of
minerals.106 As the scouting stage progresses, more heavy-duty machin-
ery is brought in to reach deeper levels of the soil, and this necessitates
the creation of even more unnatural infrastructure, such as roads.107
Moving around dirt, dust, and earth unsettles particles that land on
glaciers.108 Gradually the glaciers darken, retaining more heat, and melt
faster.109 Open-pit mining is used to mine minerals in South America,110
and this method involves blasting shelves and pits into the ground to
reach deposits.111 In the process, large amounts of water and cyanide are
used to extract the minerals, and this affects the local area’s water
supply and endangers contamination of their soil.112
100 See Robertson, supra note 36.
101 Tailings are remnants of “ground rock and process effluents that are generated in a
mine processing plant.” See What Are Tailings?, TAILINGS.INFO, http://www.tailings.info
/tailings.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012). Slurry is the milled ore. See Use of Cyanide in the
Gold Industry, INT’L CYANIDE MGMT. CODE FOR THE GOLD MINING INDUS., http://www
.cyanidecode.org/cyanide_use.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
102 See Robertson, supra note 36.
103 See id.
104 See How Gold Is Produced, BARRICK GOLD CORP., http://www.barrick.com/Investors
/AboutGold/HowGoldisProduced/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
105 ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES FOR MINING OPERATIONS, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF
ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME INDUS. AND ENV’T 1 (1998),
available at http://commdev.org/files/814_file_UNEP_UNDESA_EnvGuidelines.pdf.
106 See How Gold Is Produced, supra note 104.
107 See id.
108 See BARRICK PASCUA-LAMA SHAREHOLDER REPORT, supra note 86, at 21 (noting that
mining indirectly impacts ice features because the dust unsettled by mining activities
increases melting rates).
109 See id.
110 See Robertson, supra note 36.
111 See How Gold Is Produced, supra note 104.
112 Issue Areas, supra note 35, at subsec. “Environment.”
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The Undersecretariat of Mining for Argentina keeps available on
its website information for all the mining sites in Argentina.113 This
information can be found in varying stages of detail and accuracy, as the
mining companies themselves provide it. Often times the information is
outdated, as sites are not listed, the listed ownership of the mine is not
current, or other details from the Undersecretariat of Mining’s reports
are inaccurate.114 A number of different substances are extracted from
Argentine soil, including gold, silver, copper, iron, lithium, lime, manga-
nese, molybdenum, borates, tin, lead, zinc, and uranium.115 The website
currently names more than forty different mining sites within Argentina,
spread through ten of the nation’s twenty-three provinces.116 In Argen-
tina’s Mining in Numbers Report, its projection for 2029 shows a sub-
stantial growth in the mining industry.117
Foreign companies, largely based out of Canada, the United States,
Australia, and Europe, operate the majority of mining projects in Argen-
tina.118 These companies and their operations are larger than those of
their Latin American counterparts and tend to have more resources to
maximize the value of their mining projects.119 For this reason Latin
113 SECRETARÍA DE MINERÍA DE LA NACIÓN [NAT’L UNDERSECRETARIAT OF MINING], http://
www.mineria.gov.ar/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
114 A simple comparison between a mining company’s website and data on the
Undersecretariat of Mining’s site will reveal inconsistencies. Compare, e.g., Martha
(Argentina) Exploration, COEUR, http://www.coeur.com/exploration/martha-argentina
.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012), with Veta Martha, SECRETARÍA DE MINERÍA DE LA NACIÓN
[NAT’L UNDERSECRETARIAT OF MINING], http://www.mineria.gov.ar/proyecto/Santa-Cruz
/vetamartha.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
115 See generally Minería—Proyectos y Prospectos en la República Argentina [Mining—
Projects and Prospects in the Argentine Republic], SECRETARÍA DE MINERÍA DE LA NACIÓN
[NAT’L UNDERSECRETARIAT OF MINING], http://www.mineria.gov.ar/proyectos.htm (last
visited Apr. 6, 2012) (featuring an interactive map of provinces and their projects).
116 Id.
117 SECRETARÍA DE MINERÍA DE LA NACIÓN [NAT’L UNDERSECRETARIAT OF MINING],
MINERÍA EN NUMEROS 2009 [MINING IN NUMBERS 2009], available at http://www.mineria
.gov.ar/pdf/mineriaennumeros.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
118 See 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 33 (describing the
growth of foreign investment in Argentine mining); Mining Companies in Argentina,
ARGENTINA MINING (May 5, 2010), http://www.argentinamining.com/en/empresas
-mineras-en-argentina/ (displaying a comprehensive list of companies with mining
interests in Argentina).
119 See 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 33 (noting the
significant increase in production value and exportation); FACT PACK: SWEDISH TRADE
COUNCIL IN ARGENTINA, THE MINING AND MINING EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY: ARGENTINA 19
(2006), available at http://www.swedishtrade.se/Pagefiles/134534/Argentina%20Mining
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American national governments court foreign companies over domestic
companies: there is more promise for a larger amount of investment and
the development of a larger project, which will mean a larger operation, the
creation of more jobs, and the use of more national resources in production.
Lastly, these mining sites and the natural deposits they center
around are mostly in the Andes Mountains on the western side of Argen-
tina.120 Incidentally, the communities in the mountain towns where
mining projects are located tend to be less urban and have smaller
populations.121 This has a number of effects. The affected communities
are very distant from the ocean-side capital of Buenos Aires,122 and have
lesser access to national political recourse. The lower amount of commerce
and interaction with other parts of Argentina make local communities
more dependent on the land and environment for their sustenance.123
Additionally, these communities tend to be more simplistic and lack big-
city problems such as drugs and prostitution, which enter the communi-
ties as a result of the influx of miners and workers.124 Mining severely
disrupts the small and close ethos of communities in the Andes Mountains
near mining projects.
C. Glaciers in South America
Glaciers are an important part of the world’s ecosystem. They
store about seventy percent of the earth’s freshwater supply,125 and can
be found on every continent.126 They tend to be located in the mount-
ainous colder regions,127 and grow and shrink in line with precipitation
%20Swedish %20Trade%20Council.pdf (describing the amount of money foreign mining
companies in Argentina are investing).
120 See Minería—Proyectos y Prospectos en la República Argentina, supra note 115.
121 See González, Pascua Lama Gold Mine, supra note 55.
122 See Argentina, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the
-world-factbook/geos/ar.html (last updated Apr. 6, 2012) (click on “Click Map to Enlarge”
to see where the Chile-Argentina mining region is in reference to Buenos Aires).
123 See Mahmood Hasan Khan, Rural Poverty in Developing Countries, FIN. & DEV., Dec.
2000, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/12/khan.htm (describ-
ing how “[t]he rural poor depend largely on agriculture, fishing and forestry, and related
small-scale industries and services”).
124 See Press Release, Community Affected by Barrick Gold, supra note 49.
125 The Water Cycle: Water Storage in Ice and Snow, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://ga
.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycleice.html (last modified Mar. 9, 2012).
126 All About Glaciers: The Life of a Glacier, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR., http://nsidc
.org/cryosphere/glaciers/life-glacier.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
127 See id.; Hugo Ahlenius, Glaciers Monitored Through the World Glacier Monitoring
Service, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME GRID-ARENDAL, http://maps.grida.no/go
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and temperature levels.128 They have gone through several cycles of
more and less prolific times over thousands of years.129 Today they are
again receding,130 in part due to increased harmful human activities in
recent decades.131
Most of the glaciers in South America are located in the Andes
and other mountain ranges toward the center of the continent,132 the
same area of prevalence as that of mining projects.133 The particular
situation in the section of the Andes that Chile and Argentina share is
especially alarming because glaciers contribute importantly to the area’s
water supply.134 Large swaths of Argentina are very arid, and supplied
with water only though intricate irrigation systems of channels and
canals that bring runoff water from mountains and rivers into the areas
where it is most needed.135
Not much is known about glaciers in Argentina. The national
glacier inventory project is in its beginning stages, and as of right now
the exact “number, area, and volume” of Argentina’s glaciers is not
known.136 Therefore there is also little information about the changes in
Argentine glaciers over time and little hard and fast data about the way
that mining projects have definitively affected glaciers.
/graphic/glaciers-monitored-through-the-world-glacier-monitoring-service (last visited
Apr. 6, 2012).
128 See All About Glaciers: The Life of a Glacier, supra note 126.
129 See All About Glaciers: Facts About Glaciers, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR., http://
nsidc.org/cryosphere/glaciers/quickfacts.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (noting trends in
the Ice Age, the Little Ice Age, and other eras).
130 All About Glaciers: The Life of a Glacier, supra note 126.
131 All About Glaciers: Glaciers and Climate Change, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR.,
nsidc.org/cryosphere/glaciers/questions/climate.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
132 Compare Ahlenius, supra note 127, with Patagonia, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/media/3442/The-Southern-and-Central-Andes-and
-Patagonia (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (showing that the glaciers in the first map align
with the mountain range seen in the second).
133 See Minería—Proyectos y Prospectos en la República Argentina, supra note 115.
134 Miguel Bonasso, Agua para las Mineras o para los Argentinos [Water for the Mining
Companies or for the Argentines], CLARÍN (July 14, 2010), http://www.clarin.com/politica
/congreso/Agua-mineras-argentinos_0_298170210.html.
135 See generally Argentina, AQUASTAT, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries
/argentina/indexesp.stm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (describing the climates of Argentina,
including its arid areas, and irrigation and water control efforts).
136 See Inventario, GLACIARES DE ARGENTINA, http://www.glaciares.org.ar/paginas/index
/inventario (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
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For these reasons it is clear to see why the destruction of glaciers
by mining in Argentina is so alarming. It is difficult to tell if a proposed
mining project threatens glaciers if there is no database of glaciers in
Argentina against which to review a proposal in the first place. Addition-
ally, if mining companies are destroying glaciers to get to metal deposits,
they are reducing stores of water in the region, and they endanger the
existing water system with the toxic chemicals they use in the extraction
process and the large quantities of water that are needed simply to keep
the processes functioning.
II. ARGENTINE LEGISLATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON
OPEN-PIT MINING
Argentina is an increasingly important global player in the mining
industry. Over the past decade or two, the Argentine national government
has instigated a number of programs and regulations to invite foreign
investment and development in mining operations in Argentina.137 While
the companies that establish and operate large-scale open-pit mining
operations in Argentina come from first-world countries including Aus-
tralia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, the victims
of the environmental degradation caused by their conduct live in and are
citizens of Argentina. Thus, in constructing enforcement mechanisms,
it is most important that we consider which fora will be most accessible
for these victims.
Argentina regulates mining both at the national and at the
provincial level. The Código de Minería (“Mining Code”) is a longstanding
statute that has been revised over the years and contains many of the
national incentives for mining investment.138 In addition, the National
Congress recently passed the Glacier Law, protecting glaciers and ban-
ning mining activity proximate to their locations.139 Lastly, provincial
laws, for example those in the southern province of Chubut and in the
western province of Mendoza, ban the use of open-pit mining and ban the
use of toxic chemical substances, respectively.140 They have not, however,
been met without resistance.
137 See infra Part II.A.
138 See infra Part II.A.
139 See infra Part II.B.
140 See infra Part II.C.
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A. The Mining Code
The Mining Code is the preeminent document that governs mining
operations within Argentina.141 It was first enacted in 1887 and has seen
minor changes over the past decades, but in large part is very unrestrict-
ive and favors the investment of foreign countries in Argentina, limiting
the ability of the government to directly act against corporations.142
A few sections of the Mining Code contain laws that incentivize
investment in Argentine Mining. For example, Article 214 exempts
mining companies from all taxes or contributions imposed on mining
property rights, products, and all tools used in extraction.143 The Mining
Investment Law also contains a number of fiscal benefits, including
double deductions of exploration expenses and value-added tax reim-
bursements.144 Even today the Undersecretariat of Mining has proposed
changes to the Mining Code that, instead of protecting Argentina’s
interests, favor foreign mining companies and seek increased investment
into the industry.145
The Mining Code also facilitates mining exploration in other
ways. It establishes two broad categories of minerals. The first type is
not property of the owner of the land; rather, the minerals are owned in
origination by the provincial governments in which they are located, and
these governments have the ability to grant concession licenses to private
investors.146 This category includes the major substances mined in
Argentina: gold, silver, copper, lithium, lead, borate, and more.147 The
second type can be extracted only by the landowner, and includes con-
struction or industrial minerals and materials.148 There is also a marked
lack of regulation in areas that other nations would restrict. For exam-
ple, the Mining Code does not regulate the type of minerals extracted, so
141 CÓDIGO DE MINERÍA [MINING CODE] (LEXIS) (Arg.); 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN
ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 18–19.
142 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 18.
143 Id. at 13.
144 Id. at 8.
145 See id.
146 CÓDIGO DE MINERÍA [MINING CODE] at art. 2; see 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE
MINING, supra note 18, at 19.
147 CÓDIGO DE MINERÍA [MINING CODE] at art. 3; see 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE
MINING, supra note 18, at 19.
148 CÓDIGO DE MINERÍA [MINING CODE] at art. 2, 5; see 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE
MINING, supra note 18, at 19.
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foreign private companies may mine strategic and nuclear materials
such as uranium.149 Also, there is minimal protection of lands that may
have mineral deposits where other nations would create barriers to
protect aboriginal lands or national parks.150
The Mining Code is a largely uncontroversial document as it has
such lengthy legal precedence and does not violate the interests of for-
eign mining companies. Those newer statutes that ban particular types
of mining or are an impediment to investment are fraught with much
more media and legal debate.
B. The Glacier Law
After the National Congress’s previous failed attempt to pass a
national law protecting glaciers, it recently succeeded in voting the
legislation into effect on September 30, 2010.151 The Glacier Law contains
a number of rules angled at protecting Argentina’s glaciers,152 including
provisions creating a National Glacier Inventory,153 banning the use of
toxic substances and mining proximate to glaciers,154 and reiterating the
need for environmental impact assessments and environmental strategic
evaluations.155 Most important to this analysis are the articles that grant
implementing authority, define those functions, and enumerate sanctions
and jurisdiction.156
The implementing authority of the Glacier Law is granted to “the
institution with the highest national environmental jurisdiction.”157 It is
149 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 19.
150 Id.
151 Argentine Lawmakers Pass Glacier Law to Curb Mining, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2010,
7:37 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/30/us-argentina-mining-glaciers-id
USTRE68T2IG20100930.
152 Law No. 26639 (Régimen de Presupuestos Mínimos para la Preservación de los
Glaciares y del Ambiente Periglacial [Regimen of Minimum Standards for the
Preservation of Glaciers and the Periglacial Environment]), Oct. 28, 2010, [B.O.] (Arg.),
available in Spanish at http://infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/170000-174999/174117
/norma.htm [hereinafter Glacier Law]. For an unofficial English translation of the Glacier
Law, see Argentine National Glacier Act, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & ENV’T (Sept. 30,
2010), http://wp.cedha.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Argentine-National-Glacier-Act
-Traducción-de-CEDHA-no-oficial.pdf.
153 See id. arts. 3–5.
154 See id. art. 6.
155 Id. art. 7.
156 Id. arts. 9–11.
157 Id. art. 9 (quoting English translation, Argentine National Glacier Act, supra note 152).
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unclear from the Glacier Law who exactly this authority will be, but
Article 10 details their tasks in creating policies and programs that
implement the goals and tasks of the legislation in collusion with the
Federal Environmental Council and the National Argentine Glaciological
and Science Institute.158 Though these implementing provisions do not
relate directly to the legal enforcement of the law, they prove an impor-
tant interest and a constructed mechanism for the true enforcement of
the Glacier Law.
The Glacier Law gives jurisdiction to the location where the
infraction took place, presumably meaning the province in which the
mining site is located.159 This is consistent with the deference that cur-
rent Argentine mining laws give to provincial authorities in owning the
rights over their mineral deposits.160 It allows them to enforce their own
sanctions if they are stronger than the national ones that this Glacier
Law sets.161 Those include a warning, a fine in the amount of anywhere
from 100 to 10,000 times the minimum income of the entry-level salary
of a national public administrator, a suspension or revocation of mining
authorizations, or a definitive cessation of mining activities.162 That these
powers are in the hands of provincial authorities and that the outlined
national sanctions are achievable since corporate assets are located in
those areas and the governments control mining permits make the
Glacier Law more likely to be enforced. However, the Glacier Law
continues to face great opposition from mining companies and their
supporters: some provinces have found ways to legislate around Glacier
Law mandates,163 and others have declared the Glacier Law unconstitu-
tional in part and do not enforce those Articles—in particular San Juan,
a province whose economy is highly dependent on mining activity.164
158 Glacier Law, art. 10.
159 Id. art. 11.
160 See 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 19.
161 Glacier Law, art. 11.
162 Id.
163 Factbox: Argentine Legislation that Targets Mining, supra note 17.
164 Suspenden la Aplicación de la Ley de Glaciares en San Juan [Court Suspends the
Application of the Glacier Law in San Juan], supra note 25; see Minería—Proyectos y
Prospectos en la República Argentina, supra note 115 (showing many projects in San
Juan in the interactive map); Factbox: Argentine Legislation that Targets Mining, supra
note 17.
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C. Provincial Bans on Mining Methods
Some provinces also have their own laws that limit the permissi-
ble mining activities within their boundaries.165 Several have enacted
such legislation in the past decade: some are still in place and others
have been overturned on constitutional grounds.166 In particular, laws
from the provinces of Chubut and Mendoza exemplify two ways that
regional governments are writing laws that attack mining operations.
The province of Chubut in Argentina’s southern region of
Patagonia passed Law XVII-68 in 2003.167 This law prohibits open-pit
mining and the use of cyanide within the province.168 It also allowed the
Provincial Council of the Environment to divide parts of the province into
zones for mining development and zones exempted from the restric-
tions.169 This law actually successfully halted some mining projects in
the exploration phases and remains in place today.170
The province of Mendoza, in the central western region, passed a
law in 2007 that banned the use of toxic chemical substances such as
cyanide in any mining operation.171 The law particularly mentions the
importance of water and hydrological resources in restraining mining
activities.172 It bans the use of cyanide, mercury, sulfuric acid, and other
similar substances in all stages of mining, including prospecting, explo-
ration, exploitation, and industrialization of minerals.173 The law also
specifically involves as important authorities the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Public Works, charged with application, the Environmental
Mining Police, charged with enforcement, and the General Direction of
Irrigation, charged with managing the effects on water supply.174 This
law too has put several projects into suspension, and so far has withstood
challenges to its constitutionality.175
165 Law No. XVII-68, Cht., Apr. 9, 2003 (Arg.), [hereinafter Chubut Law No. XVII-68].
166 Factbox: Argentine Legislation that Targets Mining, supra note 17.
167 Id.; see Chubut Law No. XVII-68.
168 Chubut Law No. XVII-68.
169 Id. art. 2.
170 Factbox: Argentine Legislation that Targets Mining, supra note 17.
171 Law No. 7.722, Mza., June 20, 2007 (Arg.), available in Spanish at http://www.tribunet
.com.ar/tribunet/ley/7722.htm [hereinafter Mendoza Law No. 7.722]; Factbox: Argentine
Legislation that Targets Mining, supra note 17.
172 Mendoza Law No. 7.722, art. 1.
173 Id.
174 Id. arts. 4–5.
175 Factbox: Argentine Legislation that Targets Mining, supra note 17.
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D. An Analysis of Argentine Law
The multiple existing national and provincial laws provide a
number of ways in which mining activity is regulated and statutes under
which victims of environmental degradation may seek justice. This
evinces the growing importance of responsible mining operations and of
making the courts accessible for Argentine citizens. Though controversy
about these new laws runs high in Argentina, a fair number have with-
stood the incredible pressure of mining interests, and this at least makes
the issue of social responsibility highly palpable in political discourse.
One of the largest problems with regulations on mining is that the
sanctions aim to punish the violator and not to recompense the victims
of the violations.176 At the same time, should mining projects be success-
fully kept out of communities from the start, like some of these pieces of
legislation aim to do, the negative effects on proximate neighborhoods
will not be seen in the first place. If mining companies are simply more
aware that they are subject to restrictions and oversight by the govern-
ment, they may not be so reckless with their operations.
Each of the pieces of legislation has its own strength in creating
an ethos that Argentina will not tolerate irresponsible mining. The
reality of the global economy is that mining is a “necessary evil,” and
Argentina most likely will not halt its operations any time soon; but if
corporations can operate in a sustainable and socially responsible way,
then they can work in harmony with Argentina. Additionally, the Mining
Code, which largely encourages mining,177 is important in that it gives
power to the provinces over their own mineral deposits.178 This is good for
regulation because provincial authorities are more likely to be concerned
and involved in particular sites than is the national government. The
combination in the Glacier Law of particular rules and initiatives, spe-
cific implementation plans, and realistic enforcement schemes combine
to make the Glacier Law a relatively powerful piece of legislation as
recourse for environmental damage. However, it is highly controversial
as it is a new piece of legislation, and a tumult of cases challenging its
176 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 138, 142, 143 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., 10 REASONS TO INVEST IN ARGENTINE MINING, supra note 18, at 19 (discussing
the power of provincial governments to grant exploitation concessions to private investors
under the Mining Code).
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constitutionality is already growing.179 So far, it has largely survived
such hits, but has been applied unevenly.180 Provincial legislation is also
a controversial matter, but it is on the rise in recent years.181 It also often
takes a different tact from the Glacier Law in that it bases its bans not
around periglacial environments but rather the inarguable ill effects of
toxic chemicals and open-pit mining on the environment.182 Though some
of these statutes have been overturned,183 many are still in place and
prove the importance of protecting people and the environment to the
local communities and governments.
Though Argentine legislation restricting mining operations has
faced much opposition, it has often survived attempts to defeat it by min-
ing interests. On the whole, the rise of legislation and the re-emergence
of the Glacier Law show that more and more Argentines are aware of the
social and environmental issues implicated by mining activity. Argentina
has proven itself to be a very interested party in this struggle.
III. CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Canada is a leading country in the mining sector, with many
international mining companies originating in Canada. These include
Barrick, Goldcorp Inc., Kinross, Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd., and Yamana
Gold Inc., which all have a market capitalization size of over $8 billion
Canadian, with Barrick worth $37.1 billion.184 Canada is itself also a
large exporter of minerals and metals.185
The Canadian Environmental Protection Act, passed in 1999,
covers a wide range of environmental protection issues with the stated
aim of helping create sustainable development.186 Canadian companies
179 See supra notes 151, 163–64 and accompanying text.
180 See Danielle Sugarman, Argentina’s Law of the Glaciers: A Tortured Path to Environ-
mental Protection, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (May 9, 2011), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu
/climatechange/2011/05/19/argentina%E2%80%99s-law-of-the-glaciers-a-tortured-path
-to-environmental-protection/.
181 See supra Part II.C.
182 See supra Part II.C.
183 Factbox: Argentine Legislation that Targets Mining, supra note 17.
184 Top 20 List of the Biggest Canadian Gold Stocks, MONEYENERGY (Sept. 10, 2009),
http://www.getmoneyenergy.com/2009/09/list-largest-canadian-gold-stocks/.
185 Canada—Mining, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia
.com/Americas/Canada-MINING.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
186 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33 (Can.), available at http://
laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-15.31/.
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operating in other nations are subject to these Canadian laws. In addi-
tion to regulatory laws, two proposed bills, C-300 and C-354, would lay
the groundwork for trying companies like Barrick in Canada for their
environmental and social abuses during operations in other countries.
A. The Canadian Environmental Protection Act
The Canadian Parliament enacted the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act (“CEPA”) in 1999.187 It is the major statutory guideline
concerning environmental issues in Canada, and its stated aim is to
protect the environment through sustainable development.188 The bill
defines “sustainable development” as “development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.”189
The CEPA provides for public voluntary reporting, which means
any person with the knowledge or reasonable suspicion of the commis-
sion of an offense against the act may report their knowledge to an
enforcement officer.190 In addition, an of-age resident of Canada may
apply to the Minister and request an investigation of an offense he or she
believes has occurred.191 This petition must be more detailed than the
public voluntary report, with a formal description of the offense, the
evidence, and the identities of individuals involved.192 With this form of
reporting, the Minister must acknowledge his receipt of the request and
must update the applicant every ninety days on the progress of his
investigation into the applicant’s claims;193 should he choose to end it, he
must explain to the applicant why he did so.194
If the applicant finds the Minister’s investigation unsatisfactory,
he or she may bring an environmental protection action in any court with
proper jurisdiction.195 The applicant may file for relief by declaratory or
interlocutory order, and also may file for court costs, but not for damages.196
187 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33.
188 Id. at Declaration.
189 Id. § 3(1).
190 Id. § 16(1).
191 Id. § 17(1).
192 Id. § 17(2)(c)–(d).
193 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33, §§ 18–19.
194 Id. § 21.
195 Id. § 22(1)–(2).
196 Id. § 22(3).
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The statute of limitations to bring such a case runs for two years from
the time that the applicant becomes aware of or should have reasonably
become aware of the conduct involved in the suit.197 The burden of proof
in such case is “on a balance of probabilities.”198 The statute notes that
one of the available defenses in such a case is “the defence that the
alleged conduct is authorized by or under a law of a government that is
the subject of an order made under subsection 10(3)[,]”199 which may
allow Canadian mining companies operating in Argentina to claim that
their conduct is governed by Argentine environmental law.
The CEPA sets strict guidelines as to the use and transportation
of toxic substances.200 It also allows for cooperation on environmental
matters with other governments that have jurisdiction, which is defined
as membership with the OECD.201 Chile is a member country; Argentina
is not but does participate in a number of OECD Bodies.202
The CEPA is a longstanding piece of legislation that protects the
environment generally. It contains a few provisions that imaginably
provide a structure for a complainant about environmental damage by
a Canadian corporation in a foreign country to bring their cause in
Canada. At the same time, it does not really focus on mining as a partic-
ular environmental issue, or on cross-border violations.
B. An Introduction to C-300 and C-354
Two private members’ bills, C-300 and C-354, have become impor-
tant in recent months with regard to forcing Canadian mining corpora-
tions to respond for their actions. One, C-300, was defeated in October
2010, but not without bringing much attention to the issues it proposed to
solve.203 Another, C-354, continues in debate in the Canadian Parliament.204
197 Id. § 23.
198 Id. § 29.
199 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33, § 30(1)(c).
200 See generally id. §§ 64–72.
201 Id. § 75(1).
202 ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN: FOR A STRONGER, CLEANER, FAIRER WORLD ECONOMY 41–42, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/4/46864927.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
203 See Hill, supra note 27.
204 Jack Caldwell, Bill C-354: New Threat to Canadian Mining Companies, I THINK
MINING (Dec. 9, 2010), http://ithinkmining.com/2010/12/09/bill-c-354-an-new-threat-to
-canadiaon-mining-companies/.
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Though both bills are private members’ bills, which often do not get suc-
cessfully signed into law,205 they have shone a light onto the importance
of making Canadian companies liable for their actions across the world
and have furthered discussion on the inadequacy of corporate social
responsibility programs.
John McKay, a member of the Canadian Parliament, introduced
Private Members’ Bill C-300 on February 9, 2009.206 Its title is An Act
Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or
Gas in Developing Countries.207 Bill C-300 charged the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International Trade with the duty to
issue guidelines for corporate accountability standards by reference to
documents such as the International Financial Corporation’s Policy on
Social & Environmental Sustainability and the Voluntary Principles of
Security and Human Rights.208 It then created a mechanism for Canadi-
ans or residents of the host country to allege a specific complaint, which
would then be examined by the Ministers and acted upon.209 The bill was
widely supported by an international assortment of environmentally
focused non-governmental organizations, scholars, human rights organi-
zations, and development organizations.210 It was opposed by the mining
industry and by the ruling Conservative party in Canada, who argued
that its frameworks would be abused by companies and their competitors
and that implementation of the legislation would drive companies out
of Canada.211 The bill was defeated in Parliament on October 27, 2010,
by a narrow margin of 140 to 134.212 Much commentary and analysis of
the bill and its defeat followed, as the movement in support of the bill
had grown notably in the preceding year.213 Though defeated, the Bill
205 See An Act to Amend the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights), R.S.C. 2009, c. C-354 (Can.) (proposed legislation).
206 Corporate Accountability the Focus of John McKay’s New Private Members’ Bill C-300,
Hon. John McKay, PC MP (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.johnmckaymp.on.ca/newsshow.asp
?int_id=80484.
207 An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in
Developing Countries, R.S.C. 2009, c. C-300 (Can.) (proposed legislation).
208 Id. § 5.
209 Id. § 4.
210 See Supporters of C-300, supra note 28.
211 Hill, supra note 27.
212 Id.
213 See Jennifer Wiebe, What’s Next After Bill C-300?, MENNONITE CENTRAL
COMM.–OTTAWA OFFICE (Nov. 2, 2010), http://ottawa.mcc.org/stories/news/whats-next
-after-bill-c-300.
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brought the issue of corporate responsibility to the forefront and came
close to forcing mining companies to take a hard look at whether their
actions are truly responsible and whether mechanisms in place are really
functioning properly.
Peter Julian, also a Member of the Canadian Parliament, intro-
duced the Private Members’ Bill C-354, which is titled An Act to Amend
the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights).214 This bill would allow persons who are not Canadian
citizens to sue perpetrators of torts outside Canada within the Canadian
court system if the tort violates international law or treaties to which
Canada is a party.215 It specifically extended jurisdiction by appending
the following text to the Federal Courts Act:
The Federal Court has original jurisdiction in all cases
that are civil in nature in which the claim for relief or
remedy arises from a violation of international law or a
treaty to which Canada is a party and commenced by a
person who is not a Canadian citizen, if the act alleged
occurred in a foreign state or territory[.]216
It also listed a number of torts for which a claimant could file.217 These
included “wanton destruction of the environment that directly or indi-
rectly initiates widespread, long-term or severe damage to an ecosystem,
a natural habitat or a population of species in its natural surround-
ings[.]”218 Therefore, potentially, a victim of environmental degradation
in Argentina whose human rights are affected could sue a mining com-
pany in Canada under the theory of a commission of a tort or a violation
of international law. One blogger recognized the threat that C-354 posed
to Canadian international mining companies, and extolled the reasons
why the Bill and its supporters should be disregarded.219 He laments that
after the defeat of Bill C-300, another has cropped up to challenge the
mining industry, and “[t]his new proposal embedded in Bill C-354 is
214 An Act to Amend the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights), R.S.C. 2009, c. C-354 (Can.) (proposed legislation).
215 Id. § 25.1(1).
216 Id. § 25.1(1)(1).
217 Id. § 25.1(1)(2).
218 Id. § 25.1(1)(2)(m).
219 See Caldwell, supra note 204.
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couched in much more elegant philosophy than Bill C-300.”220 There is no
statute of limitations, so violations can be brought into court at any time
in the future.221 This legislation has yet to be passed by Parliament.222
C. An Analysis of Canadian Law
None of the Canadian legislation bans particular types of mining,
the use of toxic substances, or delineates particular illegal actions;
instead the bills and CEPA couch in vague terms a disdain for environ-
mental damage and the advocacy of corporate social responsibility.
Additionally, they do not set up regulations that can be violated and
brought into court; rather, they create a mechanism whereby a complain-
ant brings his matter to a government minister who then investigates it
and decides whether it is worthy of pursuit. This injects an interested
party, a government representative aware of the national prerogative to
reprimand or ignore the actions of mining companies, into the
adjudicative process. In short, it undercuts the complainant’s ability to
find justice.
One of the reasons that corporations oppose these pieces of legisla-
tion is that there are already corporate social responsibility mechanisms in
place.223 These corporate social responsibility programs are instituted and
enforced by the companies themselves,224 and so corporations have acted
with impunity concerning their operations in other nations. Social outcry
has developed in recent years over these freedoms, and so the Canadian
Parliament in 2005 called for legal and industry reform.225 However, these
reforms continue to be lacking. There are also inherent faults with the
corporate social responsibility concept: it provides few mechanisms for
victims to seek justice and reparation and it excludes potential victims,
interest groups, and government from the discourse on what is socially and
environmentally responsible.226 Therefore, the lax treatment of corporate
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 C-323: Status of the Bill, LEGISINFO, http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx
?Language=E&Mode=1&billId=5138027 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
223 See JP Laplante and Catherine Nolin, Snake Oil and the Myth of Corporate Social
Responsibility, CANADIAN DIMENSION (Jan. 25, 2011), http://canadiandimension.com
/articles/3613/.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See id.
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social responsibility in Canada makes it less likely that the government will
want to examine and try them for their violations.
Additionally, both the hands-off and bureaucratically mangled
procedures constructed in the CEPA and in C-300 evince a larger disin-
terest in Canada. The involved parties that reside in Canada are corpo-
rate entities who bring large amounts of money and jobs into Canada
through their operations in other nations, and this is a much less sympa-
thetic figurehead for the issue than the human victims of environmental
degradation in Argentina. Though the text of the proposed legislation has
a respectable connection to human rights,227 enforcement of international
treaties and human rights issues is much more difficult to pursue in the
country of incorporation than the country of operation.
IV. CHOOSING A PREFERABLE ROUTE TO JUSTICE
Both the Argentine legal system and the Canadian legal system
are working to develop mechanisms that regulate mining projects and
hold companies responsible for any environmental damage they may
cause. In addition, various elements of both countries’ social and political
climates contribute to the interest in prioritization of protecting people
and the environment from the negative effects of mining. An analysis of
all these factors will help show which of these two fora is better suited to
trying mining companies for their violations.
There are a number of elements in all the new legislation in Argen-
tina and in Canada that help determine its usefulness. These include the
specificity in the content of the laws, the enforcement mechanisms
established by the laws, and the quantity of such legislation and enforce-
ment bodies in each nation. The Argentine legislation largely targets the
specific modes of operation for projects: where they may be located and
what substances and techniques they may use.228 The Canadian legisla-
tion, on the other hand, focuses more on the human rights violations that
occur when mining companies ruin environments, and predicate these
concerns on the destruction of the environment generally.229 Because the
Argentine laws have such clear directives, it will be much easier to see
when a company violates those and to build a case than it will be for a
227 An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in
Developing Countries, R.S.C. 2009, c. C-300 § 5(2)(b)–(d) (Can.) (proposed legislation).
228 See supra notes 147–48, 152–55, 171–73 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 205–07, 213–17 and accompanying text.
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victim to develop broad claims about environmental destruction and the
violation of human rights to a standard that will raise the concern of the
reviewing Minister. Secondly, the Argentine enforcement mechanisms
are much more clear, tangible, and impartial than the Canadian system
involving allegations and investigation by ministers. Because the na-
tional and provincial legislation delegates authority to the provincial
courts, enforcement takes place much closer to the victims and to the site
of the violation, instead of with a foreign national government.230 The
nature of court systems is that they aim to provide justice and impartial-
ity in decision-making. These elements are much foggier when a claim
goes under review by a Minister of the national government, who then
decides whether to pursue the claim and investigate it further. There is
a high risk that political concerns and priorities will make their way into
the evaluative process. Lastly, there are many more layers of mining
laws and legislation in Argentina than there are in Canada.231 This
ensures more rules and jurisdictions in which to seek justice, as opposed
to the situation in Canada, where legislation directed at this mining
issue has yet to actually pass a vote in the Parliament.232 The elements
of legal content, enforcement mechanisms, and number of statutes favor
Argentina as the better venue in which to bring a claim.
There are additional factors as well within each country that favor
and disfavor their interest in these types of litigation. These include the
interested parties that have representation within each nation and the
presence of mining issues in the political discourse. The victims of envi-
ronmental degradation are located in Argentina. Given proper support
from the growing number of environmental interest groups,233 they
increasingly make their plight known and garner support from the public
and politicians. The megalith mining corporations are based out of
Canada, and with operations across the globe their financial importance
and lobbying pressure are great. Additionally, because most mining
projects in Canada are in sparsely populated areas,234 there isn’t the
same clash of communities and corporations that there is in Argentina.
230 See supra notes 146, 159, 167–70 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
233 See Supporters of C-300, supra note 28 (listing a range of environmental and human
rights groups that supported Bill C-300).
234 See, e.g., The Atlas of Canada: Table 1. Some Major Mines by Ecozone, NATURAL RES.
CANADA, http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/site/english/maps/environment/ecology/humanactivities
/mines_table.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (showing mining projects in Canada by region).
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In political debate, the voices of mining corporations are often much
louder than those of the interests who protect the environment. This
truth is clearly shown in the prevalence of mining issues in the social
and political discourse: while numerous pieces of legislation are being
proposed and passed in Argentina,235 press about the issue is flying left
and right,236 and the nation is seriously re-evaluating the inviolability it
had previously granted to mining companies, the same level of preva-
lence is not seen in Canada. The few efforts at legislative change are at
an impasse or have even been voted down, and there is minimal press
surrounding the issue of mining. This lack of interest within Canada as
opposed to rapidly rising interest in Argentina also supports the argu-
ment that Argentina is a better forum for adjudicating claims over
environmental degradation.
The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that Argentina is
inherently a more interested nation. The issue of mining has particularly
become more pressing in recent years as larger and more threatening
mining projects have come to life, spurring legislative, social, and politi-
cal reaction. For this reason at this time Argentina shows better promise
as a forum nation. Canada continues to be far distanced from these
issues, and the corporate social responsibility of mining companies is a
low-level interest. It is quite possible that the lynchpin of the issue in
Canada is that the government allows corporations to set their own
social responsibility and sustainability guidelines, and in turn enforce
them; however, this dynamic is drawing increased criticism within
Canada.237 If the momentum of the movement toward government-
implemented corporate social responsibility can reach far enough into the
currently untouchable mining sector, Canada may one day become a
second defender of environmental and human rights in the struggle
against irresponsible and destructive mining.
235 See supra Part II.
236 See, e.g., Factbox: Argentine Legislation that Targets Mining, supra note 17.
237 See, e.g., Laplante & Nolan, supra note 223.
